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Abstract
In this paper we use newly available individual-level data from the
Longitudinal Survey of Italian Households to investigate the factors
aﬀecting women’s employment after the birth of the ﬁrst child. We ﬁnd
that a higher degree of job stability and employment protection favour
a stronger labour market attachment on the part of new mothers. Even
after accounting for diﬀerences in average weekly hours, we ﬁnd that
women working in the public sector have a probability to be employed
after chilbirth which is more than 20 percent higher than that of women
with similar characteristics working in small private ﬁrms. Overall, the
analysis conveys the picture of a ‘dual’ labour market where women
with highly protected and stable jobs ﬁnd it easier to combine career
and family, while those who are less sheltered by the legislation are
more likely to withdraw from the labour market.
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11 Introduction
Unlike in many other European countries, such as the UK and Sweden for
instance, female participation rates in Italy are still very low, with one out
of two married women aged 14-64 being out of the labour force. Although
the incompatibility between child rearing and work in the marketplace is
often advocated as the main reason for the low labour market participa-
tion of Italian women, we are aware of very little empirical research which
investigates women’s working patterns immediately after childbirth in Italy.
In this paper, we use newly available micro-data from the Longitudinal
Survey of Italian Households (LSIH) to analyse the decision of married or
cohabiting women to work at diﬀerent points in time after becoming moth-
ers. We are particularly interested in the eﬀect of employment protection
and job security as captured by the diﬀerence between public and private
sectors and the dimension of the ﬁrm in which the woman worked before
the birth of the child. We limit our analysis to the transitions following
the birth of the ﬁrst child because, as documented in Solera (2003), Italian
women are unlikely to experience a career break more than once in their
lives, and this usually occurs in correspondence with the birth of the ﬁrst
child.
Public sector employees in Italy are typically granted a higher level of
employment security and job stability with respect to workers in the pri-
vate sector.1 Employment in the public sector is usually seen as a life-time
job, a ‘secure asset’ that oﬀers certainty for the future and which is largely
protected against economic downturns. The ﬂow of expected income loss in-
curred by quitting such jobs is therefore very high and this should promote
a higher labour market attachment.
In order to analyse new mothers’ employment patterns, we estimate the
probability that a woman is working 12, 24 and 36 months after the birth
of her ﬁrst child. Our results show that the factors aﬀecting employment
after childbearing are similar at 12, 24 and 36 months after childbirth. This
conﬁrms that, unlike the UK where the typical choice is one of interrupted
employment (Joshi et al., 1996), in Italy women who exit the labour market
do not immediately re-enter it.
We ﬁnd in our analysis that the degree of job stability and employment
protection seem to play a major role. In particular, women working in the
public sector or in big private companies have a much higher employment
attachment than women working in small private ﬁrms and this eﬀect is
only partly accounted for by shorter working hours prevailing in the public
sector. The importance of employment protection is also conﬁrmed by the
eﬀect of the type of work contract. Women without a permanent position,
i.e. without a contract or with a ﬁxed term contract, are more likely to
withdraw from the labour market.
Other important factors determining new mother’s employment are the
educational attainment and the amount of experience accumulated in the
1A formal deﬁnition of employment security is given in ILO (2002): “protection against
arbitrary dismissal, regulation on hiring and ﬁring, employment stability compatible with
economic dynamism” (p. 3).
2labour market. In particular, we ﬁnd that women with a higher level of
education and with a longer experience in the labour market have a higher
probability of working after the birth of the ﬁrst child. As for the role of
part-time and child care, which are two factors frequently emphasised in the
empirical literature on women’s fertility and labour market participation,
we ﬁnd that while the former exerts a weak eﬀect on new mother’s labour
market attachment, the latter is strongly signiﬁcant.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we discuss
the literature and present the variables which are the main focus of our
analysis. In section 3, we look at the Italian legislation on employment
protection in more detail. Section 4 describes the data and the procedure
of sample selection, while section 5 introduces the theoretical model which
provides an interpretive framework for the empirical analysis of section 6. In
section 7, we present and discuss our results. Section 8 concludes, providing
further considerations and discussing the policy implications of our study.
2 The determinants of employment around child-
bearing
A comprehensive review of the most important determinants of women’s
employment around childbearing can be found in Lehrer and Nerlove (1986)
and, more recently, in Dex and Joshi (1999). In these studies, women’s
education and wages usually appear among the most important factors as-
sociated with the labour supply behaviour of women with young children
(Moﬃtt, 1984; Dex et al., 1998). This is because childrearing is intensive in
the mother’s time so that its opportunity-cost increases with women’s wages
(Becker, 1965; Willis, 1973).
Other variables frequently considered are the husband’s education and
socio-economic status, which may exert important income eﬀects (Blossfeld
et al., 1995), and the cost and availability of child care (Ermisch, 1989; Del
Boca, 2002). More recent studies highlight the role of cohort eﬀects (Colom-
bino and Di Tommaso, 1996; McCulloch and Dex, 1997), the structure of
the welfare system and family policy regulations (R¨ onsen and Sundstr¨ om,
1996; Wetzels, 1999; Lauer and Weber, 2003) and family background (Del
Boca et al., 2000).
The main focus of the paper focuses is on the eﬀect of employment
protection on women’s labour supply decisions in the period after childbear-
ing. Our data is derived from the Longitudinal Study of Italian Households
(LSIH), a newly available retrospective survey which collects information on
individual employment and family histories. We are particularly interested
in the eﬀect of employment protection and job security as captured by the
diﬀerence between public and private sectors and the dimension of the ﬁrm
in which the woman worked before the birth of her child. This is justiﬁed by
the diﬀerent levels of employment protection legislation (EPL) enjoyed by
private ﬁrms of diﬀerent size and the public sector. We shall devote the next
paragraph to the description of the EPL in Italy and public-private sectors
diﬀerences while we describe here other variables included in the analysis.
3Among the other factors explaining employment choices of new mothers
which have been investigated in the literature, we place particular empha-
sis on the role of human capital variables. The amount of labour market
experience, for example, is likely to positively aﬀect the degree of labour
market attachment. It contributes to the human capital stock and there-
fore increases both the current and the future opportunity-cost of a labour
market withdrawal. This eﬀect is usually found in studies which consider
the role of potential experience on women’s wages and then estimate the
impact of wages onto the employment status of new mothers (Klerman and
Leibowitz, 1994). Others estimate the direct eﬀect of experience on em-
ployment following childbearing. Guti´ errez-Domen` ech (2003), for instance,
ﬁnds that in Belgium, West-Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden women who
have a higher working experience before motherhood are also likely to be
employed afterwards.
It is often argued that the lack of part-time jobs represents a major
obstacle to female labour force participation since a reduced working time
is seen as a means to reconcile home and market work. According to this
argument, women with part-time jobs should be more likely to be employed
in the period around a birth event. By contrast, a long experience in part-
time jobs may be an indicator of lower labour market attachment and we
could ﬁnd an eﬀect in the opposite direction.
The latter might be the case especially in Italy. Sociological research by
Stier et al. (2001) classiﬁes Italy as a conservative welfare regime in which:
“the state, the market, the family and the church share responsibility for
citizens’ welfare” (p. 1734). In this setting women are expected to give
a higher priority to their parental role, and new mothers are more likely
to withdraw from the labour market when their labour force attachment is
already low. Moreover, part-time workers may not ﬁnd convenient to stay
in employment when publicly-funded child care is scarce (or child care costs
are high) as their expected labour income is low as compared to full-time
workers (Del Boca, 2002).
Although there are several studies which analyse women’s labour force
participation jointly with fertility decisions, in Italy there is a very limited
amount of research that focuses on female employment around childbearing.
Among recent examples, we ﬁnd the studies by Del Boca (2002), who anal-
yses the employment decision of women with children aged 0-2, and Bratti
(2003), who investigates women with children aged 1-2. Among new con-
tributions we ﬁnd the analysis of transition probabilities between diﬀerent
labour market states around childbearing by Del Boca et al. (2003a), and a
study of post-birth labour force status up to eight years after the ﬁrst birth
by Guti´ errez-Dom` enech (2003).
However, to the best of our knowledge, so far there has been no at-
tempt to investigate the eﬀect of employment protection on new mother’s
employment choices. This is mainly due to the lack of microdata on women’s
fertility and employment histories. The recent release of the LSIH allows
the opportunity to ﬁll this gap and analyse new mother’s employment by
4looking at the role of past jobs and work experience.2 Before presenting the
data and proceeding with the analysis, however, it is useful to look more
closely at the employment protection legislation in Italy. In the next section
we explain in some detail the reason why in Italy the public sector and (to
a lesser extent) large private ﬁrms oﬀer their employees a higher degree of
employment protection than small and medium-size ﬁrms.
3 Employment protection legislation
As far as Italy is concerned, employers can ﬁre workers for a ‘justiﬁed ob-
jective reason’ (giustiﬁcato motivo oggettivo), which includes reasons con-
cerning the production activity, the organisation of work and its regular
functioning. Alternatively, they can ﬁre their employees for a ‘justiﬁed sub-
jective reason’ (giustiﬁcato motivo soggettivo), which applies in case of a
serious breach of the worker’s duties. Furthermore, when an even more seri-
ous breach of conduct is observed, a worker can be dismissed without notice,
i.e. for a ‘just cause’ (giusta causa).
These general rules apply to all ﬁrms, but the degree of employment
protection is closely linked to the size of the ﬁrm. The most important piece
of Italian legislation on this matter distinguishes between ﬁrms with 15 em-
ployees or less, and larger ﬁrms (see Statuto dei Lavoratori, 1970, art. 18).
In general, a dismissed worker can bring legal proceedings against her em-
ployer. The court then decides about the legitimacy of the dismissal. Firms
with more than 15 employees are required to rehire illegitimately dismissed
employees and to pay them all of the wages they lost during the litigation
period. By contrast, ﬁrms with 15 employees or less are not required to
rehire dismissed workers even if the court has ruled that their dismissal was
illegitimate, but pay just a monetary compensation to the worker.
Another diﬀerence is that in case of dismissal for a ‘justiﬁed objective
reason’ ﬁrms with more than 15 employees are required to prove that the
redundant workers could not have been employed in other activities within
the same establishment, or in other establishments within the same ﬁrm,
also in other geographical locations. It is clear that larger ﬁrms ﬁnd it
harder to satisfy this requirement, since it is diﬃcult for them to prove that
a worker could not have been assigned to another establishment or could
not have performed equivalent tasks within the same establishment. For
the same reason, dismissals for a ‘justiﬁed objective reason’ are almost non-
existent in the public sector, which is less exposed to economic downturns
and where workers can be easily assigned to other tasks within the same
public administration or moved to other public administrations within the
national territory.
There is also an additional major diﬀerence between small and large (or
public) ﬁrms. This refers to another form of ﬁring, known as ‘collective
dismissals’ (Legge n. 223/1991), which can be used only by ﬁrms with more
2To the best of our knowledge, these data have been used for similar purposes only
by Solera (2003) who examines changes across cohorts in the determinants of exits and
re-entries into employment. However, her work does not focus on the period around
childbirth and the study mainly features a comparison between Italy and Great Britain.
5than 15 employees and applies in case of an adverse economic shock which
requires them to ﬁre more than ﬁve workers at the same time. In this case,
the ﬁrm can enlist the dismissed workers in a special ‘waiting scheme’ (lista
di mobilit` a). This scheme allows the workers to claim beneﬁts (although
they are not oﬃcially unemployed), oﬀers them the opportunity to take a
temporary job in the public sector, provides a social security contributions
discount to the ﬁrm that subsequently hires them, and gives them priority
in matching vacancies advertised by local job centres (Uﬃci Regionali del
Lavoro). As large ﬁrms are more likely to use this procedure, it follows
that their employees enjoy a substantially higher employment protection
compared to those working in smaller ﬁrms.
These rules diﬀerentiate clearly between small and private ﬁrms and, by
extension, between private and public sector jobs, since the Public Adminis-
tration can be considered as a very large employer whose activity is almost
totally insulated with respect to economic ﬂuctuations.3
To the best of our knowledge the present is the ﬁrst paper looking at the
diﬀerences in new mothers’ employment between the public and the private
sectors and the role of employment protection. However, the previous liter-
ature, although not speciﬁcally focused on new mothers’ working decisions,
has shown that in Italy the public and the private sectors are diﬀerent and
that the role of employment protection may be important.
For instance, Pagani (2003) ﬁnds that people look more intensively for
a job in the public sector the more unfavourable the labour demand condi-
tions, the degree of job security and prospects of wage increases are in the
private sector. This explains, for example, the job market strategy of people
living in the South of Italy, where the average unemployment rate and the
unemployment duration are higher than in the rest of the country. A simi-
lar result is found by Alesina et al. (1999), who show that since public jobs
oﬀer a large income premium and greater security with respect to private
sector jobs, people living in the South of Italy often prefer long period of
unemployment to taking a job in the private sector. They also show that
individuals do not exit the public sector unless they are forced to.
Other studies focus on the wage diﬀerential between private and public
sectors, controlling for endogenous selection of workers in the two sectors
(Cannari et al. 1989; Brunello and Rizzi, 1993; Brunello and Dustmann,
1997). There is almost no evidence that in Italy endogenous selection into
sector of activity occurs, while the structure of wage diﬀerentials appears to
diﬀer according to skills, education, age and gender of workers. Looking at
the earnings dynamics in the two sectors, Cappellari (2002) ﬁnds that public
sector workers enjoy higher starting earnings, but ﬂatter income proﬁles
as compared to private sector workers. He also shows that public sector
employees enjoy a lower degree of earnings uncertainty. Lucifora and Meurs
(2003) show that, with respect to the private sector, the public sector pays
a wage premium for low skilled workers, while the opposite holds for high
skilled workers, and that these eﬀects are even more pronounced for women.
3Moreover, creation of public sector jobs has been often used as a countercyclical policy
measure to raise employment. Public sector jobs are thus characterised by a much higher
degree of security with respect to private sector jobs.
6As we have seen in detail in the previous section, there are also marked
diﬀerences between private ﬁrms of diﬀerent size. Because of these diﬀer-
ences, Garibaldi et al. (2003) analyse the behaviour of ﬁrms below the
threshold ﬁxed by the legislation (15 employees), which “face a trade-oﬀ be-
tween dynamic eﬃciency (the possibility of adjusting their size in response
to future shocks) and average long-run size (the possibility of growing below
the threshold)” (p.2). In both their theoretical and empirical analysis, they
ﬁnd that many ﬁrms prefer dynamic eﬃciency and choose not to cross the
threshold. They also show that the 1990 employment legislation protection
reform, which increased ﬁring costs for small ﬁrms relatively to large ﬁrms,
slowed down the growth of small ﬁrms signiﬁcantly. Coherently with this
evidence, in a recent paper Kugler and Pica (2003) ﬁnd that the increase in
dismissal costs in Italy after 1990 decreased accessions and separations in
small relative to big ﬁrms, especially for women.
The type of contract is another factor related to employment protection
and job security. Fixed-term contracts are often thought to be a stepping
stone towards more stable working experiences. However, the economic lit-
erature shows that this is not necessarily the case. Using French data, Blan-
chard and Landier (2002) ﬁnd that the spreading of ﬁxed-term contracts
leads to a high turnover in entry-level jobs without a substantial reduction
in unemployment. Booth et al. (2002) observe that in the UK temporary
workers enjoy lower levels of job satisfaction, receive less training and are
less well-paid, all factors that are likely to aﬀect their future employabil-
ity and labour market attachment. As for Italy, Accornero et al. (2000)
ﬁnd evidence that atypical/ﬁxed-term contracts are seldom an entry-port
for more stable and regular jobs and that this phenomenon mainly aﬀects
women. Hence, we would expect female participation after childbirth to be
even lower for mothers who previously worked with a ﬁxed-term contract or
in the informal sector.
4 The LSIH data and sample description
A largely unexplored and interesting source of data for our purposes is the
Longitudinal Survey of Italian Households (LSIH). The survey is conducted
by the University of Trento, Istituto Trentino di Cultura and the Italian
Oﬃce of National Statistics (ISTAT) on a representative sample of Italian
families. The ﬁrst wave of the survey was carried out in 1997 and a second
and third follow-ups took place in 1999 and 2001, respectively.
Our sample is derived from the 4,713 families interviewed in the ﬁrst
wave of the survey since at the time of our study this was the only sweep
publicly available. The dataset includes retrospective information on the
10,423 adult members of each family. This allows us to construct the ‘life-
history’ of each respondent in relation to the following aspects: timing of
births, family formation and structure, education, work and occupation,
social background and geographical or residential mobility.4
4For a more detailed description of the data and the structure of the survey see Schizze-
rotto (2002).
7With respect to past labour market histories, we are able to observe
whether an individual was primarily in school, working, or engaged in some
other activity from the age of 18 to the date of the interview. For those who
were working, we have information on the sector and occupational qualiﬁca-
tion of the job, whether the employment episode was full-time or part-time,
on the type of contract, and on the hours usually worked during the week.
For those who were engaged in other activities, it is possible to distinguish
between unemployment and out-the-labour-force states. The latter includes
people who are retired, carrying out the obligatory military service, stu-
dents, housewives, those who are in parental leave, and in temporary or
permanent sickness leave.
The main weakness of the dataset is that there are no income and earn-
ings variables, except for total household net income and each member’s
contribution to it (in %) at 1995. However, educational attainment and oc-
cupational qualiﬁcation variables are collected at a very disaggregated level
and are available at various points in time, so that they are considered good
proxies of an individual’s wage and family income.
The initial sample consists of 5,469 women aged 18 or above who were
interviewed in 1997. Of these women, 4,143 formed at least one marriage
or one cohabiting relationship and 3,732 of them have at least one child
by the time of the interview. The mean age at ﬁrst union for this sample
is about 24.20 years, while the mean age at the birth of the ﬁrst child is
about 25.51 years. Oﬃcial statistics for Italy reveal that in 1997 the mean
age at ﬁrst marriage for women was around 27.1 years and the mean age at
the birth of the ﬁrst child was 28.1 years (ISTAT). The diﬀerence between
our data and oﬃcial statistics can be explained by the fact that while the
latter refer to period measures of the above indicators, the former are based
on retrospective information. Given the trend towards postponement of
marriage and maternity of the last decades, it is reasonable to expect that
women in our sample exhibit a younger age at ﬁrst marriage and at ﬁrst
birth.
In order to control for the characteristics of the partner, we consider
only women who had only one marriage or one cohabiting relationship, thus
excluding single mothers.5 This reduces the number of observations to 3,919
married women, about 72% of the original sample.6 We further select only
women born after 1940, in order to minimise the eﬀect of recollection errors
and exclude women that we do not observe for the entire 3-year window after
the birth of the ﬁrst child because this period deﬁnes our dependent variable.
This means that younger women do not appear in our sample. Additionally,
we do not take into account women who had a ﬁrst birth within 7 months
from the date of marriage to ensure that the variables collected at the time of
marriage and used in the empirical analysis are predetermined with respect
to the birth event. This reduces the sample to 2,011 women, 1,763 of whom
5Out-of wedlock births, which include births in cohabiting unions, were about 9% of
total live births in 1997 (see Annuario Statistico Italiano 2002).
6We decide not to draw a distinction between cohabiting and married couples as co-
habitation is a very recent phenomenon in Italy, and simply refer to marriage to address
both types of unions.
8Table 1: Patterns of employment before and after the ﬁrst birth
Employment Full time Part time
obs. % obs. % obs. %
Neither before or after 528 29.95 582 33.01 1,603 90.92
Before only 337 19.12 348 19.74 69 3.91
After only 42 2.38 40 2.27 32 1.82
Both before and after 856 48.55 793 44.98 59 3.35
Total 1,763 100 1,763 100 1,763 100
Note: The period before is any period before the birth of the ﬁrst child. The period after
is three years since childbirth
had a child by 1997.
In considering the woman’s employment history during the ﬁrst three
years after the ﬁrst birth we deﬁne economic activity distinguishing be-
tween employment and non-employment and consider the period spent in
maternity leave as employment as long as the total number of months of self-
reported maternity leave does not exceed the compulsory period imposed by
the legislation.7 As shown in Table 1, around 70% of women in our sample
have at least one employment experience either before or during the three
years after the birth of the ﬁrst child. In particular, 48% of women are
employed sometime before and after childbearing, while almost 20% stop
working with the birth of the child and do not start again in the ﬁrst 36
months after. Only a negligible percentage of women have never worked
before becoming mothers and start working only after the birth of their ﬁrst
child.
Table 1 also shows that very few women work part-time. The deﬁnition
of part-time is based on a self-declaration of the respondent and is consis-
tent with that used by ISTAT. We do not distinguish between voluntary
and involuntary part-time because of small cell size. Indeed, we see that
the percentage of women who had a part-time job before the birth of the
ﬁrst child is very small (only about 3.9%), and falls even further (to 3.3%)
during the three years after the birth. As found in aggregate national statis-
tics, our data seem to conﬁrm that part-time employment in Italy is either
not available or not chosen by new mothers. Therefore, in what follows
we simply analyse women’s employment status after childbearing without
distinguishing between full-time and part-time jobs.
Since the fraction of new mothers who start working only after childbear-
ing is very modest (2.38%), we focus our empirical investigation on women
who showed a certain degree of attachment to the labour force. This leads
us to exclude women who never worked before marriage, dropping a further
7The latter provides for a period of compulsory leave that lasts 5 months (2 months
before and 3 months after the birth) and during which the woman is entitled to 80% of
her salary, and an additional period of optional leave which can last up to 6 months (until
the child’s 1st birthday) and during which the remuneration falls to 30% of the usual take
home pay (Legge 30 dicembre 1971 n. 1204). The legislation on parental leave in Italy
has been recently modiﬁed (Legge 8 marzo 2000 n. 53), but the new law came into power
after the end of our observation period and therefore it did not aﬀect the behaviour of the
individuals included in our analysis.
9700 observations.8 We introduce dummy variables for missing values but
a few additional cases need to be excluded because for some variables the
number of non-response items is too small to be treated as a separate cate-
gory. As a consequence, our ﬁnal sample consists of 1,297 women, 1,106 of
whom had the ﬁrst child by 1997.
The average woman in this sample gets married at age 24.63, which is
a number very close to the mean for all women in our survey (24.20 years).
However, she has a child at age 26.5, almost 1 year later than the average
woman in the whole dataset. This diﬀerence is entirely due to the fact that
we consider only women with stronger attachment to the labour force, who
tend to postpone fertility decisions. If we were to consider in our sample also
those women who never had an employment spell before marriage, we would
observe a mean age at the birth of the ﬁrst child of about 25.62 years, which
is not statistically diﬀerent from the 25.50 recorded for the original dataset.
This suggests that our sample selection procedures have not generated a
sample with diﬀerent observable characteristics with respect to the original
dataset and we therefore proceed with our analysis.
5 A simple analytical framework
In this section we analyse women’s labour supply decisions in the period
around the birth of the ﬁrst child. The theoretical model presented here
is extremely stylised because our main aim is to provide only an intuitive
analytical and interpretive framework for the econometric analysis. In par-
ticular, the model disregards the potential endogeneity of fertility decisions
and the monetary costs of purchased child care in order to focus on the role
of employment protection. As we shall see, given the very high percentage
of women who give birth to at least one child, and the fact that in the em-
pirical analysis we consider only women with a high degree of attachment to
the labour force, the potential sample selection bias due to the endogeneity
of fertility turns out not to be an issue. Moreover, in Italy the purchase
of child care appears to be rather limited (Del Boca 2002; Del Boca et al.,
2003b).
Let us consider a woman who is working before having a child. At time
0, the period around childbirth, she must decide whether to interrupt her
career or not. We consider two cases, which we label the over-optimistic ex-
pectations and the over-pessimistic expectations case, respectively. In the
over-optimistic expectations case, a woman who decides to drop out of the
labour market to look after her child expects to be able to ﬁnd the same kind
of job she had before quitting once she decides to return to employment. In
the over-pessimistic expectations case, a woman expects to quit her job per-
manently if she withdraws from the labour market because of childbearing.
Using these two hypothetical and rather extreme cases we intend to describe
8In an earlier version of this paper we included in our sample also women who had
never worked before marriage and used a dummy variable in order to identify this group.
The dummy had a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of being employed
after childbirth, but all other results were not qualitatively diﬀerent from those reported
in the present analysis.
10the way in which women form their expectations with respect to their labour
market opportunities, while it is clear that a more realistic situation would
lie somewhere in between.
Let us assume that a woman’s utility depends on her life-time ﬂow of
earnings and on the utility derived from child rearing and that there is no
discounting of utility. In the case of over-optimistic expectations, a woman’s
utility can be expressed as follows :










where i is the subscript for a generic individual, w0 is the wage at time 0,
PF is the exogenous probability of being ﬁred, which is assumed constant
over time, and T represents the end of the time horizon (with T > 0). We
also assume that the wage is a linear function of time spent in the labour
market, so that δ is the return to experience.
The model assumes that a woman receives some utility from her child,
and that this utility is diﬀerent depending on whether the woman is em-
ployed or not at the birth of the child. In the ﬁrst case the utility derived
from the child is u0
i(child), while in the second case it is u1
i(child).9 The
labour force decision of the individual at time 0 is indicated by l0, which
assumes value 1 if the woman is employed and 0 if she experiences a career
interruption.10
If a woman holds over-optimistic expectations, she anticipates that lτ =
1, for all τ > 0. In other words, even if she quits her current job because of
childbearing, she expects to ﬁnd employment afterwards with probability 1
and to receive a starting wage equal to her previous wage since her human
capital is not aﬀected by depreciation. However, in each period she faces an
exogenous probability of being ﬁred, PF.11
A woman’s expected utility when l0 = 0 is:
U0
i = w0(1 − PF) +
T X
τ=2
(w0 + δ(τ − 1))(1 − PF)τ + u0
i(child), (2)
while her expected utility when l0 = 1 is:
U1
i = w0 +
T X
τ=1
(w0 + δτ)(1 − PF)τ + u1
i(child). (3)




9In analogy with Cigno (1991), and unlike Walker (1995), we do not assume a recursive
structure for the utility of fertility, i.e. that children give a ﬂow of utility also for all periods
following childbearing.
10Note that here we do not distinguish between participation and employment.
11Note that we assume that a woman is subject to the probability PF to be ﬁred in each
period, and even if she has just been hired.





of childrearing do not depend on the woman’s observed characteristics, but
are idiosyncratic stochastic terms unobservable by the researcher, it is easy
to show that the probability that a woman decides to continue working is:
Pr(U1
i − U0
i > 0) = Pr(u0
i − u1
i < w0 + δ
(1 − PF)
PF
(1 − (1 − PF)T). (4)
If we deﬁne G ≡ w0 + δ
(1−PF)






i > 0) = Pr(i < G), (5)
which shows that factors which increase the expected income ﬂow, G, reduce
the probability that a woman interrupts her career.
For example, let us consider the eﬀect on G of a change in the exogenous








A necessary and suﬃcient condition for this derivative to be negative is
that:




which turns out to be always true for PF ∈ (0,1). Therefore, an increase
in the ﬁring probability is associated with an increase in the probability of
experiencing a career interruption around childbirth.
Moreover, a greater starting wage (due for example to higher education
or higher past working experience) or a steeper earnings proﬁle are always
associated with a lower probability of a career interruption at childbirth, as







(1 − PF) − (1 − PF)T+1
PF
> 0. (9)
In the case of over-pessimistic expectations, a woman’s expected utility




since lτ = 0 for all τ > 0. On the other hand, when l0 = 1, U1
i is the same
as before. Therefore, it turns out that:
Pr(U1
i − U0
i > 0) = Pr(u0
i − u1
i < w0 +
T X
τ=1
(w0 + δτ)(1 − PF)τ). (11)
12In analogy with the previous case, let us deﬁne G ≡ w0 +
PT
τ=1(w0 +
δτ)(1−PF)τ and i ≡ u0i−u1i, and analyse the eﬀect of a change in one of the
exogenous variables on the probability of experiencing a career interruption


















τ(1 − PF)τ > 0. (14)
Therefore, the signs of the eﬀects of increasing the ﬁring probability, or
the starting wage, or the steepness of the earnings proﬁle on women’s labour
supply decisions around childbirth are all preserved. It must follow that the
signs are the same also in intermediate cases and that the implications of a
change in the exogenous variables are invariant with respect to diﬀerences in
expectations about future employment opportunities held by the individual.
The over-optimistic and the over-pessimistic expectations cases can be
seen as metaphors of a ﬂexible or a highly regulated labour market, in which
it is, respectively, very easy or very hard to ﬁnd a new job once an individual
quits her previous one. Since in the over-pessimistic expectations case the
expected income loss associated with a career interruption is higher than in
the over-optimistic expectations case, it follows that the probability of an in-
terruption must be lower. Therefore, a stagnant and scarcely ﬂexible labour
market is also one in which women who work exhibit a stronger attachment
to the labour force and do not quit their jobs because of childbirth.
This situation could reﬂect, for instance, what is found for Italy by Stier
et al. (2001), who analyse women’s employment patterns in 12 industri-
alized countries and observe “[...] in Israel, Italy, and, to a lesser extent,
Austria, [...] large proportions of women in continuous full-time employ-
ment and continuous non-employment”.12 Similarly, Solera (2003) ﬁnds
that with respect to the UK a substantial fraction of Italian women never
enter employment and that uninterrupted participation is by far the most
diﬀused pattern among those who work.
The most important aspect of this model is, for our aim, the eﬀect of
the ﬁring probability, PF, on the probability of a career interruption around
childbirth. If we consider the ﬁring probability as being inversely related
to employment security and protection, it follows that women in more pro-
tected jobs, such as those employed in the public sector or in big private
companies, are less likely to quit around the time of childbearing. On the
contrary, women in less protected jobs, such as those working in the informal
sector or in small private companies, are more likely to quit at the time of
the birth of their child. In our framework, this is simply due to the fact
that women enjoying a lower degree of employment security have a lower
12See Stier and Lewin-Epstein (2001), p. 1748.
13expected ﬂow of future income. As we shall see below, this prediction is
entirely supported by our empirical evidence.
6 The econometric model
The way in which women form their expectations about their future em-
ployment opportunities is likely to be somewhere in between the processes
described by equations 4 and 11. However, in section 5 we proved that the
eﬀect of a change in one of the exogenous variables on the probability of a
career interruption is the same independently of the type of expectations,
so that in considering the application of this model to the data no further
considerations are needed.
On the other hand, a more general framework would require us to con-
sider factors other than those included in G. This is why in the empirical
speciﬁcation of the model we control for a wider set of variables which in-
cludes proxies for G, such as educational qualiﬁcations, past labour market
experience, occupation and sector of activity of the woman, but also the
availability of child care or variables related to the characteristics of the
partner.
Taking as our reference period the 3-year interval after the birth of the
ﬁrst child, we can express the utility associated with a career interruption,
U0












where t is the date of birth of the ﬁrst child, j = 1,2,...,36 indicates the
number of months after the birth, i is the subscript for the generic individual,
Xi,t−m is a vector of women’s characteristics taken at the time of marriage,
which occurs m months before the birth of the ﬁrst child, and u1
i,t+j and
u0
i,t+j are the random idionsyncratic components of the indirect utilities














Deﬁning i,t+j ≡ u1
i,t+j −u0
i,t+j and β ≡ β1 −β0, we can rewrite (17) as:
U∗
i,t+j = βjXi,t−m + i,t+j. (18)
13For ease of exposition we indicate with t the time of birth of the ﬁrst child and with m
the number of months between marriage and the birth. A more rigorous notation would
require the use of ti, because the timing of the ﬁrst birth is individual speciﬁc. Similarly,
we should use mi instead of m.
14However, we do not observe the latent utility variable U∗
i,t+j, but only
the decision made by a woman. Thus, the observed decision rule is:
Ui,t+j = 1 if U∗
i,t+j > 0, (19)
which indicates that Ui,t+j takes on value 1 if a woman works in period t+j,
and 0 otherwise. Hence, the decision of working after childbearing can be
analysed through a standard probit model where we simply assume that i
follows a standard normal distribution. Formally, we can write:
Prob(Ui,t+j = 1) = Prob(U∗
i,t+j > 0) = Φ(βjXi,t−m), (20)
where Φ(·) is the standard normal distribution function.
This empirical framework will be explored in the following section in
order to analyse the employment status of new mothers during the three
years following childbirth. Although the choice of a 3-year window may seem
arbitrary, this is a conventional time-frame as this period is long enough to
describe the main features of employment following childbirth and is short
enough to eliminate the inﬂuence of other events, such as the birth of a
second child or a change in the marital status of the individual (R¨ onsen and
Sundstr¨ om, 1996). Moreover, we have a useful indicator of the availability of
child care only for the 3 years after the birth of the child, but after this period
no information on child care arrangements is available from the survey.14
As we have seen in equation (20), we use as explanatory variables the
characteristics of a woman and of her husband at the date of marriage or
before. This is in order to consider these variables as predetermined with re-
spect to fertility decisions and subsequent employment choices. It is however
possible that these regressors, in particular those related to past labour mar-
ket experience, are not exogenous with respect to fertility and employment
decisions after childbearing if some relevant characteristics of the individu-
als remain unobservable. This is the case even if the variables are taken at
the time of marriage or are associated to the job of longest duration before
marriage.15 In order to account for this problem and given the speciﬁc focus
of the paper (the employment behaviour of new mothers), we restrict our
analysis to women who exhibit a high degree of labour market attachment
and include in our ﬁnal sample only those who experience at least one em-
ployment episode before marriage.16 This is thought to reduce the degree
of heterogeneity in our sample.
Among the variables included in Xi,t−m, we consider the woman’s sector
of activity in the job of longest duration before marriage, her highest level of
14We carried out additional analysis on a 5-year window always excluding our indicator
for child care availability and did not ﬁnd major qualitative diﬀerences with respect to
the results reported here.
15The last job at marriage does not coincide with the job of longest duration at marriage
in 20% of cases. But the diﬀerences are small: only 9% of women change type of contract
and sector of activity, 13% change size of ﬁrm, 10% occupational group, 4% working type
arrangement. Thus, the results of our analysis do not change much if we consider the last
job instead of the job with the longest duration at the time of marriage.
16We have seen in Table 1 that the percentage of women that start working only after
childbearing is negligible.
15education at marriage, her husband’s occupation and age at marriage, cohort
and geographic diﬀerences. We also take into account the occupational
qualiﬁcation and type of contract of the woman’s job of longest duration
before marriage, the percentage of working experience spent in part-time
jobs, in the main pre-marital job, the cumulative number of months spent
in employment, and an indicator of past unemployment duration up to the
time of marriage. Additional factors included are the availability of child
care and the number of hours worked in the main pre-marital job. Table A1
in the Appendix reports some summary statistics for our sample.
Before estimating equation (20) one needs to be careful because the
employment decision after childbirth is observed only for mothers and the
sample of mothers might not be a random sample of the whole female pop-
ulation. In other words, unobservable factors aﬀecting motherhood could
also inﬂuence post-birth employment decisions. If a selection process under-
lying the fertility decision is at work and is ignored, then the estimates of
the impact of some variables of interest on the employment decision will be
biased.
In order to test for selection into motherhood, we estimate a probit
model with sample selection, where the selection equation is represented by
the decision of having a ﬁrst child and the main equation is represented by
the employment equation in (20).17 In order to identify the employment
from the fertility equation, we include the number of siblings of the woman
at 14 years in the fertility equation as a proxy for her ‘taste for children’
and exclude this variable from the employment equation. In none of the
speciﬁcations of our model we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation between the error
terms of the employment and fertility equations, despite the fact that the
eﬀect of the number of siblings on fertility is highly signiﬁcant. Accordingly,
in the next section we simply present the results of the estimation of a probit
model without selection.18
7 Results
7.1 Public vs. private and the role of employment protection
In this paper we are mainly concerned with the degree of employment pro-
tection on women’s labour supply decisions in the period after childbearing.
In order to capture employment protection we use a dummy variable which
assumes value 1 if the job of longest duration held by a woman at the time
of marriage was in the public sector and value 0 if this was in the private
sector. As we explained in section 3, the degree of employment protection is
very highly correlated with the type of sector, both because of the diﬀerent
impact of the economic cycle on public and private ﬁrms and because of
diﬀerences in the legislation.
17See Van de Ven and Van Pragg (1981).
18Two factors may contribute to the absence of a signiﬁcant selection bias: (i) we are
excluding from the analysis women who never worked before marriage in order to have a
more homogeneous sample, and (ii) there is a very high percentage of women in marital
or cohabiting unions with children (more than 85%).
16It is of course possible that the existence of a public/private sector dif-
ference in new mothers’ employment status is due to the fact that women
working in the public sector diﬀer with respect to some unobserved char-
acteristics from women working in the private sector and that these char-
acteristics also aﬀect the probability of working after the birth of the ﬁrst
child. In other words, we should be careful in interpreting the eﬀect of the
sector of activity, which represents our proxy for employment protection, in
terms of causality as it could be endogenous with respect to women’s labour
market attachment.
In order to account for this problem, one could adopt an instrumental
variable strategy and ﬁnd a variable which aﬀects the woman’s employment
status after childbearing only through the eﬀect on the type of sector in
which she works. However, it is clear that in our context it is extremely
diﬃcult to ﬁnd a valid instrument to control for the endogeneity of the
public/private sector dummy. For this reason, we control for factors which
can be thought to be correlated with the choice of sector of activity, such as
the woman’s educational qualiﬁcation and her region of residence (Pagani,
2003), and we use an incremental strategy in order to analyse the way in
which the eﬀect of the public sector dummy changes as more and more
control variables are added to our speciﬁcation. This exercise helps us to
gauge to what extent our estimates may be aﬀected by an omitted variable
bias problem.
We ﬁrst estimate a simple speciﬁcation of the model. We look at the
eﬀect of the public sector dummy on the probability that a woman is em-
ployed 12, 24 and 36 months after the birth of the child while controlling
for the level of education of the woman, her husband’s age and occupation,
cohort eﬀects and geographic dummies. As we can see from the ﬁrst row of
Table 2, a woman working in the public sector has a probability of being
employed at 12, 24 and 36 months after the birth of the ﬁrst child which is,
respectively, 24, 27 and 28 percentage points higher than a woman working
in the private sector. This eﬀect is also always signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Adding more control variables, such as the type of occupation and the
type of contract of the job with the longest duration before marriage, reduces
the eﬀect of the public sector dummy by about 1 or 2 percentage points. By
including the woman’s working experience until marriage or controlling for
the availability of child care we ﬁnd instead that the eﬀect of the dummy of
interest remains almost totally unaltered. It is only when we consider the
eﬀect of working hours, which are likely to be very diﬀerent between public
and private sector jobs, that the eﬀect of the public sector is reduced. But
even in this case, the variation is small, a magnitude of 1.5 or 2.2 percentage
points depending on the time period considered.
As we saw in section 3, the eﬀect of the employment protection legislation
varies according to the dimension of the ﬁrm, with smaller size private ﬁrms
granting the lowest levels of protection. Thus, in the ﬁnal speciﬁcation we
distinguish private ﬁrms on the basis of the number of employees and this
leads us to compare women working in the public sector to women working
in private sector ﬁrms with 15 employees or less (the reference category).



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18probability of being in employment after the birth of the ﬁrst child becomes
larger. This is an expected result, as we are comparing jobs characterized
by the highest and the lowest degree of employment protection, respectively.
Although we have controlled in our speciﬁcation for some observable
characteristics aﬀecting the sector choice, it is possible that women with a
strong attachment to the labour force, and therefore higher wages, choose
public sector jobs which are better paid than private sector jobs at least for
unskilled workers (Lucifora and Meurs, 2003). This could be a problem for
our analysis because we cannot control for diﬀerences in wages. However,
Brunello and Rizzi (1993) and Brunello and Dustmann (1997) analyse wage
diﬀerentials between private and public sector jobs in Italy and ﬁnd no
evidence of endogenous selection into sector of activity. Although these
studies suggest that the endogeneity of sector choice with respect to wages
may not a problem, it remains the issue that diﬀerences of work attachment
between public and private sectors may also stem from diﬀerences in the
expected earnings ﬂow which are not related to diﬀerences in the degree of
employment protection but to diﬀerences in hourly wages.
In order to take into account this possibility, we constructed interactions
between the public sector dummy and the categorical variables representing
education and job qualiﬁcation. The ﬁrst type of interactions were never
statistically signiﬁcant, proving that the eﬀect of the public sector is homo-
geneous across diﬀerent educational levels. The interactions between sector
of activity and occupational qualiﬁcation were also not signiﬁcant, although
in this case we had to group occupational dummies in larger categories
because of small cell size and multicollinearity problems (i.e. almost all em-
ployees in the public sector are white collar workers). Thus, as far as we
can see, the positive eﬀect of working in the public sector on the probability
of being employed after the ﬁrst birth is not likely to originate from wage
diﬀerentials.19
These results and those presented in 2 reveal that adding diﬀerent sets
of control variables to our model or checking for interaction eﬀects does not
signiﬁcantly reduce the public sector employment premium. In all these
cases, and for all the time periods considered, the eﬀect of working in the
public sector is to increase the probability that a woman is employed after
the birth of the ﬁrst child by at least 20 percentage points, and this is always
highly signiﬁcant. Therefore, it is possible to think that, even if we may have
omitted some important characteristics of the individual which could aﬀect
her choice of the sector as well as her labour supply decisions, this problem
would have only a modest eﬀect on the results of our analysis.
Table 3 presents in more detail the results of the model estimated ac-
cording to the last speciﬁcation of the employment equation shown in Table
2. 20 Once again we present our results at 12, 24 and 36 months since child-
19All the results not presented in the paper are available from the authors upon request.
20This speciﬁcation was adopted after performing a series of Wald tests for variables
exclusion. The other variables which were initially included in the analysis were the
religion of the woman, her husband’s level of education, the industry of the job of longest
duration at the time of marriage and a variable indicating whether the job was seasonal or
not, the woman’s parents’ education and occupational group. All these variables turned
19bearing. The choice of these speciﬁc points in time may seem arbitrary, but
it is nevertheless representative of women’s employment status during the
3-year window after the birth of the ﬁrst child. Indeed, estimating monthly
probit models for each of the 36 months after childbearing reveals that the
predicted probabilities are smooth enough, i.e. they do not have spikes at
12, 24 and 36 months, so that by showing results corresponding to these
speciﬁc points in time no important aspect of the analysis is lost.
As we can see, the eﬀect of the public sector dummy is not only signiﬁcant
at the 1% level, but is also one of the most important determinants of
employment after childbearing. Women whose longest pre-marital job is in
the public sector are 23, 24 and 25 per cent points more likely to be employed
12, 24 and 36 months after the birth of the child than women who mainly
work in small ﬁrms (i.e. less than 15 employees) in the private sector. We
also see that, with the exception of ﬁrms with 16-50 employees, there is a
positive eﬀect of ﬁrms’ size on the probability of new mothers’ employment.
This diﬀerence is also evident from the top-right graph of Figure 1, which
shows the predicted monthly probabilities of employment by ﬁrm size for all
the entire 3-year window. Here, it emerges clearly that women working in the
public sector have an employment probability after childbearing well above
the employment probability computed for women working in the private
sector, independently of the size of the ﬁrm. Only women working in very
large ﬁrms (with more than 200 employees) show an employment probability
similar in magnitude to that of women working in the public sector, but this
is true only for the ﬁrst year after childbearing. Afterwards, the gap of the
employment probabilities between these two groups increases again.21
Because of the very low turnover in the public sector, it is likely that
women whose main pre-marital job was in the public sector are very likely
to occupy the same position also later on. Therefore, the positive eﬀect of
the public sector dummy on employment status may reﬂect the possibility
of combining career and motherhood that public sector jobs oﬀer since they
are characterized by a relatively short working week with respect to private
sector jobs. Indeed, we saw in Table 2 that introducing working hours
reduces the eﬀect of the public sector dummy although this variation is
modest. We now see from Table 3 that the eﬀect of working hours is negative,
as we would expect. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient implies that increasing
weekly hours worked by one unit reduces the probability of working by 0.5,
0.4 and 0.4 percentage points at 12, 24 and 36 months, respectively.
The importance of employment protection as captured by the sector
of activity seems to be conﬁrmed by the eﬀect of the type of contract of
the main pre-marital job. Working in the informal sector, i.e. without a
contract, as opposed to working with a permanent contract, reduces the
out not to be signiﬁcant at the 5% statistical level, either individually or jointly, and were
therefore excluded from the analysis.
21This might be because the Italian legislation determines some diﬀerences in maternity
leave rights between private and public sector employees. These diﬀerences are mainly
related to the period after the ﬁrst year of the child. In particular, the legislation does
not allow women working in the private sector to take paid leave in case the child is sick,
while in the public sector a woman is entitled to up to a month of paid leave until the










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note. This ﬁgure shows the predicted probabilities associated with some speciﬁc variables
computed from monthly probit models.
22probability of being employed at 12, 24 and 36 months after childbirth by
18, 17 and 20 percentage points, respectively. This is also shown in Figure 1,
where we see that a woman with a permanent contract has a probability of
being in employment of about 65%, almost 20 percentage points more than
a woman without a contract and 10 percentage points more than a woman
with a ﬁxed term contract.
7.2 The eﬀect of other factors
Consistently with the model outlined in section 5 and with what has been
found in many other studies (Klerman and Leibowitz, 1994; Dex et al., 1998;
Bratti, 2003), we ﬁnd that the level of education raises the probability of
employment after childbirth. Having a university degree as opposed to hav-
ing only primary or no educational qualiﬁcations increases the probability
of working by about 39 percentage points at 12 months since birth.22 The
eﬀect is very similar also at 24 and 36 months. The premium in the proba-
bility of employment for women with upper or lower secondary schooling is
somewhat smaller, but always very signiﬁcant as also shown in Figure 1.
Another aspect which was emphasized in the theoretical model was the
eﬀect of past labour market experience, here captured by variables such as
the cumulative experience of employment or unemployment up to the date
of marriage, the percentage of the period spent in the job with the longest
duration and the percentage of the period spent in part-time jobs. As we
can see in Table 3, an increase in working experience positively aﬀects the
probability of being employed after the birth of the ﬁrst child. Similarly, we
ﬁnd that women who have experienced unemployment are less likely to be
employed after becoming mothers with respect to women who have never
been unemployed. The eﬀect is particularly strong and highly signiﬁcant for
women aﬀected by a longer cumulative unemployment experience.
Increasing the amount of past labour market experience accounted for by
part-time work is associated with a premium in the probability of working at
12 and 24 months of about 0.2 per cent points and this eﬀect is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5% level. This result is probably associated with the
fact that working part-time might be a woman’s preferred mode of labour
market participation also in the absence of childbearing. Therefore, those
women who worked part-time in the past are probably more likely to stay
in a part-time job after the ﬁrst birth, which increases their opportunities
of reconciling work with childrearing. It would have been interesting to
explore this eﬀect further, but this was not possible because of the very
small number of women working part-time in our sample.
In analyzing the eﬀect of occupational qualiﬁcation, we compare women
in unskilled manual jobs with women occupying more qualiﬁed positions,
which should also receive a higher wage. As we can see from Table 3, there
22Using data from the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (Bank of Italy) and
focusing on women aged 21-39 only, Bratti (2003) estimates a similar strong eﬀect of
women’s education on participation. For the 1993 average diﬀerences in the probability
of participation between women with university degrees and primary and lower secondary
education were of 58 and 46 percentage points, respectively.
23is no clear indication that occupational categories may reﬂect wage diﬀer-
entials as the signs of the dummies are sometimes negative and sometimes
positive. However, these eﬀects are almost always statistically insigniﬁcant,
with the exception of the dummy representing women working in low-skilled
white-collar jobs who are unexpectedly found to have a lower probability of
being employed after childbirth with respect to women working as unskilled
manuals.
As for the husband’s characteristics, we ﬁnd some evidence of an income
eﬀect. A woman whose partner is an entrepreneur or a skilled manual worker
has a lower probability of being employed after childbirth with respect to a
woman whose partner is an unskilled manual worker. Although some of the
other marginal eﬀects are not statistically signiﬁcant, the overall signs of the
partner’s occupation status are generally negative. Moreover, the existence
of an husband’s income eﬀect seems to be suggested also by the sign of the
husband’s age, which can be considered as a proxy for his labour market
experience and therefore his wage. 23
As shown in several studies (Duncan and Giles, 1996; Del Boca, 2002;
Maurenzi and Pagani, 2003), child care availability is a very important factor
for the reconciliation of career and family responsibilities. Therefore, we use
a dummy for the absence of institutional and informal child care as an
additional explanatory variable in our employment equations. The results
show that the lack of child care opportunities has a negative and highly
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of being in employment subsequent to
childbirth. The eﬀect on the probability of employment is of -26, -25 and -21
percentage points, respectively, at 12, 24 and 36 months after childbirth.24
The last graph in Figure 1 shows that a woman who can rely either on
formal or informal child care is almost 20 percentage points more likely to
be in employment during the 3 years after childbearing than a woman with
no child care availability. Very interestingly, we ﬁnd a negative spike around
the ﬁrst child’s birthday when the optional leave period expires. This seems
to suggest that women who are employed before having a child may use
the entire period of optional leave allowed by the legislation before quitting
their jobs. Since the provision of child care services for children aged 3
or less is still very limited in Italy (Del Boca et al., 2003b), the period of
maternity leave is not long enough to solve the problem of reconciling career
with motherhood and many women are forced to leave employment until
new arrangements become available.
Overall, the empirical analysis conveys the picture of a ‘dual’ labour
23Other studies ﬁnding a negative husbands’ income eﬀect for Italy are for instance
Colombino and Di Tommaso (1996) and Di Tommaso (1999).
24The exact formulation of the question about child care is: “In the ﬁrst three years after
the birth did you receive child care help from your relatives, other people or institutions
(e.g. kindergarten)?”. There are four possible answers: 1 “yes, it was free”, 2 “yes, it was
not free ” , 3 “no, we had no need”, 4 “no, we did not have availability of relatives/other
persons/institutions”. Since the ﬁrst three answers could be endogenous with respect to
women’s employment decisions, we decided to use only the fourth answer. We constructed
an indicator of child care availability using a dummy variable with value one when child
care was not available from either of the three possible sources. Arguably, this variable is
less aﬀected by endogeneity problems.
24market. Women with jobs providing a higher degree of employment pro-
tection ﬁnd it easier to combine career and family, while those who occupy
less regular positions, and are therefore less sheltered by the legislation, are
more likely not to be employed after the birth of their child. These ef-
fects are captured by variables such as the sector of activity of the job with
the longest duration held before marriage, but also emerge by looking at
the sign and the signiﬁcance of variables related to the type of contract of
the main pre-marital job and the cumulative experience of employment or
unemployment up to the date of marriage.
8 Conclusions
This paper investigates the factors aﬀecting the employment decisions of
married women during the 3-year period following the birth of the ﬁrst
child. Our results show that a higher degree of job stability and employment
protection, as captured by the distinction between private and public sector
jobs, diﬀerent types of contract (or lack of it), and past labour market
experience are strongly associated with women’s probability of working after
childbirth. This conﬁrms what found by R¨ onsen and Sundstr¨ om (1996),
Ondrich et al. (1996) and by Guti´ errez-Dom` enech (2002) for other European
countries.
In particular, there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the behaviour of women
working in the public vs. private sector. Even accounting for diﬀerences
in weekly hours worked, we ﬁnd that women whose main pre-marital job
was in the public sector ﬁnd it much easier to combine career and family
responsibilities and are more likely to be employed after the birth of the
child. This is hardly surprising if we look at the experience of Northern
European countries, such as Sweden and Denmark, where the rates of female
participation went hand in hand with the expansion of the public sector
(Esping-Andersen, 1997, 1999).
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the public sector premium becomes even larger
when we compare the eﬀect of working in the Public Administration to that
of working in a small private ﬁrm. Since in Italy the employment protection
legislation operates a clear distinction between ﬁrms with diﬀerent dimen-
sions, providing employees working in larger companies with a higher degree
of protection, this leads us to think that the public sector premium can be
largely attributed to a diﬀerent degree of job stability and employment pro-
tection enjoyed by workers. A simple theoretical model is suﬃcient to show
the economic incentives underlying this intuition.
Supporting evidence is also found by looking at the sign and the sig-
niﬁcance of other control variables. For example, women working in the
informal sector do not beneﬁt from any employment right and are found
to have a signiﬁcantly higher probability of withdrawing from the labour
force after becoming mothers. Additionally, women with a longer past em-
ployment experience and who have cumulated less unemployment are much
more likely to work after the birth of the child. The combination of all
these eﬀects seems to point out to the existence of a sharp distinction be-
25tween women who enjoy a high degree of employment stability and those
who work in less secure jobs. It follows that policies aimed at the regulariza-
tion of informal workers and at the protection of employment may be very
successful at increasing the probability of employment of new mothers.
As for the two most emphasized tools intended to favour the combination
of career and motherhood, that is to say the provision of child care and
part-time jobs, we ﬁnd only mixed evidence in our data. While the lack
of informal and publicly funded child care is found to signiﬁcantly reduce
the probability of employment after childbirth, our analysis reveals only
weak evidence in support of a positive eﬀect of part-time work. However,
since our data set consists of women from many diﬀerent cohorts and part-
time employment is only a relatively recent phenomenon in Italy, we think
that no ﬁnal consideration should be reached in this respect and this aspect
should be more thoroughly investigated using micro-data coming from other
sources.
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30Appendix
Table A1: sample descriptive statistics
Variable mean st. dev. obs.
Employed after 12 months since the ﬁrst child 0.63 0.48 1106
Employed after 24 months since the ﬁrst child 0.62 0.48 1106
Employed after 36 months since the ﬁrst child 0.61 0.49 1106
Woman in public/private sector - longest job before marriage
Reference: private ﬁrm with < than 15 employees 0.32 0.47 1106
Private ﬁrm with 16-50 employees 0.12 0.33 1106
Private ﬁrm with 50-200 0.09 0.29 1106
Private ﬁrm with >200 0.07 0.26 1106
Private ﬁrm number of employees missing 0.16 0.36 1106
Public sector 0.19 0.39 1106
Woman’s working hours - longest job before marriage 41.07 10.88 1058
Woman’s type of contract - longest job before marriage
Reference: permanent 0.61 0.49 1106
Fixed term 0.13 0.33 1106
No contract 0.14 0.34 1106
Missing 0.04 0.19 1106
Woman’s education - at marriage
Reference: primary or not formal schooling 0.26 0.44 1106
Lower secondary school 0.42 0.47 1106
Upper secondary school 0.32 0.47 1106
University degree 0.07 0.25 1106
Woman’s work experience - at marriage
% Job exp. in P-T jobs 6.02 22.78 1106
% Job exp. longer job 84.45 20.22 1106
Job experience (months) 73.34 45.99 1106
Woman’s unemployment - at marriage
Reference: never unemployed 0.89 0.31 1106
Less than 1 year 0.06 0.24 1106
More than 1 year 0.05 0.21 1106
Woman’s occupation group - longest job before marriage
Reference: unskilled manual 0.20 0.40 1106
Entrepreneurs 0.02 0.13 1106
Professionals (self-employed) 0.08 0.28 1106
White collar - high 0.32 0.47 1106
White collar - low 0.27 0.44 1106
Skilled manual 0.11 0.31 1106
Partner’s occupation group - at marriage
Reference: unskilled manual 0.13 0.34 1106
Entrepreneurs 0.08 0.27 1106
Professionals (self-employed) 0.14 0.35 1106
White collar - high 0.21 0.41 1106
White collar- low 0.10 0.30 1106
Skilled manual 0.26 0.44 1106
Missing 0.07 0.25 1106
Partner’s age - at marriagea 27.84 4.19 1014
Childcare not available 0.05 0.23 1106
Woman’s birth cohort
Reference: 1940-44 0.16 0.37 1106
1945-49 0.24 0.42 1106
1950-54 0.19 0.39 1106
1955-59 0.19 0.39 1106
1960-64 0.16 0.36 1106
1965-69 0.07 0.26 1106
Geographical area - at marriage
Reference: South 0.23 0.42 1106
North West 0.33 0.47 1106
North East 0.20 0.40 1106
Centre 0.16 0.36 1106
Isles 0.07 0.27 1106
Note. a Refers to non missing values only.
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